WEST PALM BEACH CAR ACCIDENT PLAINTIFF’S BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF HIS MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY
OF DEFENDANT’S EXPERT
Introduction
This is a third-party auto negligence case arising out of a rear-end auto accident that occurred on August 11, 2000. As a result of the accident, the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff sustained serious injuries to his neck that required surgical intervention.
The Defendant apparently intends to dispute the causation of the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff’s injuries and has retained engineer [Expert] as an expert witness in this regard. Based upon his deposition testimony, [Expert] apparently intends to testify at trial that the accident did not cause the injuries sustained by West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff.
[Expert] is being held out by the Defendant as a biomechanical engineer with expertise in injury causation in motor vehicle accidents. As a retired automotive engineer without any medical training, knowledge, or experience, [Expert] is unqualified to testify in any area involving physical injuries and their possible causes. Even if [Expert] were qualified to testify in those areas, [Expert] bases his testimony on unscientific “studies” that do not satisfy the requirements of the Michigan courts. Simply put, in accordance with the Michigan Rules of Evidence and both state statutory and common law, [Expert] should not be permitted to testify as an expert in this case on the cause or etiology of the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff’s cervical disk injuries.
Statement of Facts
A. The Case
This case involves a three-car automobile accident that occurred on August 11, 2000 at approximately 12:50 in the afternoon. (Exhibit 1, Police Report). Defendant was traveling west on West Road at approximately 25 miles per hour. (Exhibit 2, Deposition of Defendant p.15). Ms. testified that she did not notice that the cars in front of her had stopped and could not avoid rear-ending the vehicle in front of her. Ms. testified that she did not apply the brakes until she was half a car length behind the vehicle in front of her. (Exhibit 2, p. 18).
The driver in the vehicle that was initially rear-ended was seventy-six year old Mrs. . Mrs. testified that she was stopped and was approximately two car lengths behind the car in front of her when she noticed Ms. ’s vehicle approaching in her left side-view mirror. (Exhibit 3, Deposition of , p. 11.) Mrs. applied pressure to her breaks in expectation of the collision, and was struck by Ms. . (Exhibit 3, p. 12.) Mrs. testified that she did not hear tires squealing before the accident. As a result of the collision, Mrs. ’s vehicle was sent forward and into the rear of the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff’s vehicle. Mrs. estimated that her vehicle was pushed forward more than 12 feet as a result of being struck by Ms. _____. (Exhibit 3, p. 13.)
The West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff was the driver of the third vehicle involved in the accident. His vehicle was stopped because there was a car in front of him who was stopped and waiting for traffic to clear to make a left turn. (Exhibit 4, Deposition of West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff p. 26.) West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff’s car was then struck suddenly and unexpectedly by Mrs. _____’s vehicle.
West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff was wearing his seat belt, and testified to being jerked forward and then back as a result of the accident. (Exhibit 4, p. 36.) As West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff fell back into the seat, he struck his left shoulder against the bucket seat. West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff testified to feeling immediate pain. (Exhibit 4, p. 37.) The investigating police officer, , testified that West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff made complaints of pain to him immediately after the accident. (Exhibit 5, Deposition of Officer _____, p. 10.)
West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff’s pain steadily increased during the next two hours after the accident, after which West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff went to the Emergency Department for treatment. (Exhibit 6, History and Physical report, p. 1; Exhibit 4, p. 42.) During the examination, Dr. found that “the left hand is icy cold as compared to the right hand.” (Exhibit 6, p. 1.) Dr. _____ diagnosed West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff with a spinal cord injury in the cervical spine area. A CT scan of the spine showed a central herniated disk at the C4-5 level. Dr. also diagnosed lumbosacral radiculopathy with weakness with brisk reflexes. (Exhibit 6, p. 2).
On November 16, 2000, West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff underwent major surgery as a direct result of the injuries sustained as a result of the auto accident on August 11, 2000. The surgery required the removal of West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff’s herniated discs at C4-5 and C5-6 and their replacement with donated disks and a steel plate. (Exhibit 7, Operative Report.)
B. Defendant’s Proffered Expert
Defendant’s proffered expert witness, [Expert], has concluded that the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff could not have sustained any injuries as a result of the accident in question, despite objective medical evidence to the contrary. (Exhibit 8, p.15). This type of testimony requires that an expert be qualified based upon education, training, and specialized skill. In particular, such an expert must have significant medical training to render an opinion on injury causation.
[Expert] is completely unqualified to render any opinion as to the likelihood of whether an event caused a particular bodily injury. In the present case, he is not qualified by any means to testify regarding the cause of the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff’s injuries.
At his discovery deposition, [Expert] was examined extensively to determine whether he has qualifications to render an opinion on causation in this case. [Expert’s] own testimony alone regarding his education and training suffices to bar him from rendering an opinion regarding the cause of the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff’s injuries. The West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff has listed below numerous reasons why [Expert] is an unqualified witness:
a. He has no medical training whatsoever (Exhibit 8, p.14);
b. He never attended medical school (Exhibit 8, p.25 );
c. He is not certified as a biomechanic (Exhibit 8, p.35);
d. He has never taken a course in anatomy or physiology (Exhibit 8, p.25);
e. He does not subscribe to any medical journals (Exhibit 8, p.26);
f. He has never written or published an article relating to any aspect of injury causation in low-speed auto accidents (Exhibit 8, p.62);
g. He did not review the deposition transcripts of any of the parties or witnesses (including those of the police officer or driver of the second vehicle) (Exhibit 8, p.12-13);
h. He does not know what a cervical herniated disk is or what potential for injury a low speed accident could have for a cervical disk (Exhibit 8, p.32);
i. He is completely unfamiliar with the anatomy of the spine (Exhibit 8, p. 31, 32);
j. He did not review the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff’s medical records (Exhibit 8, p. 13, 14);
k. He is not qualified to review diagnostic films like CT Scans or MRI’s (Exhibit 8, p.31);
l. He has never qualified to testify as to the causation of injuries and admits that he is not an expert on injury causation issues (Exhibit 8, p.35, 39, 40);
[Expert’s] total lack of experience, skill, education, or knowledge in the field of medicine, or any related field, is undeniable. Notwithstanding this lack of qualifications, [Expert] plans to testify that “the forces involved in the accident and the accelerations are well within the powers of a human being.…” (Exhibit 8, p.15).
Law
A. The Davis-Frye Test
Courts in Michigan conduct a Davis-Frye1 test to make a preliminary assessment as to the admissibility of expert testimony. The Davis-Frye test is based on Michigan Rules of Evidence 104(a) and 702. Anton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 Mich. App. 673, 678; 607 N.W.2d 123 (Mich. App. 1999). While MRE 104(a) allows courts to conduct a preliminary analysis concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, MRE 702 sets forth the qualifications necessary for an individual to testify as an expert witness.
If the court determines that recognized scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
MRE 702 (emphasis added).
For testimony to be admissible under MRE 702, therefore, the starting point in the analysis is whether the witness possesses the necessary qualifications to testify to the subject in question. Once an expert is qualified to testify, a trial court then:
determine[s] the evidentiary reliability or trustworthiness of the facts and data underlying an expert’s testimony before that testimony may be admitted. To determine whether the requisite standard of reliability has been met, the court must determine whether the proposed testimony is derived from “recognized scientific knowledge.” To be derived from recognized scientific knowledge, the proposed testimony must contain inferences or assertions, the source of which rests in an application of scientific methods. Additionally, the inferences or assertions must be supported by appropriate objective and independent validation based on what is known, e.g., scientific and medical literature. This is not to say, however, that the subject of the scientific testimony must be known to a certainty, Daubert, supra at 590. As long as the basic methodology and principles employed by an expert to reach a conclusion are sound and create a trustworthy foundation for the conclusion reached, the expert testimony is admissible no matter how novel. Id. at 596; see Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 273 U.S. App. D.C. 32, 41; 857 F.2d 823 (1988).
Nelson v. American Sterilizer Co., 223 Mich. App. 485, 491-492; 566 N.W.2d 671 (Mich. App. 1997) (emphasis added) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993)).
In sum, a Davis-Frye inquiry pursuant to MRE 702 requires that the Defendant show that the basis of the expert’s testimony is recognized “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”2
B. The Daubert Test and MCLA 600.2955
The United States Supreme Court established in Daubert, supra, the guidelines that Federal courts use in determining whether experts are qualified to testify pursuant to FRE 104 and FRE 702, the Federal equivalent of MRE 104 and 702. According to Daubert and FRE 702, “a witness must first establish his expertise by reference to ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.’” Berry v. Crown Equipment Corporation, 108 F. Supp.2d 743, 749 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (quoting FRE 702). In assessing whether an expert is qualified to testify, courts are to examine “not the qualifications of a witness in the abstract, but whether those qualifications provide a foundation for a witness to answer a specific question.” Smelser v. Norfolk Southern Railway Company, 105 F.3d 299, 303 (6th Cir. 1997) cert. denied, 188 S.Ct. 67, 139 L.Ed.2d 29 (1997).
Once the proposed expert witness is found to be qualified in the proposed area of testimony, “he must then provide further foundational testimony as to the validity and reliability of his theories.” See Berry, 108 F. Supp.2d at 749. The Daubert court provided a specific framework that district courts should use when determining whether the source of the testimony is valid and reliable. See Berry, 108 F. Supp.2d at 749. Michigan has recently codified that framework in MCL 600.2955; MSA 27A.2955. Greathouse v. Rhodes, 242 Mich. App. 221, 238; 618 N.W.2d 106, 115 (Mich. App 2000). That statute states in relevant part:
In an action for the death of a person or for injury to a person or property, a scientific opinion rendered by an otherwise qualified expert is not admissible unless the court determines that the opinion is reliable and will assist the trier of fact. In making that determination, the court shall examine the opinion and the basis for the opinion, which basis includes the facts, technique, methodology, and reasoning relied on by the expert, and shall consider all of the following factors:
(a) Whether the opinion and its basis have been subjected to scientific testing and replication.
(b) Whether the opinion and its basis have been subjected to peer review publication.
(c) The existence and maintenance of generally accepted standards governing the application and interpretation of a methodology or technique and whether the opinion and its basis are consistent with those standards.
(d) The known or potential error rate of the opinion and its basis.
(e) The degree to which the opinion and its basis are generally accepted within the relevant expert community. As used in this subdivision, “relevant expert community” means individuals who are knowledgeable in the field of study and are gainfully employed applying that knowledge on the free market.
(f) Whether the basis for the opinion is reliable and whether experts in that field would rely on the same basis to reach the type of opinion being proffered.
(g) Whether the opinion or methodology is relied upon by experts outside the context of litigation.
(2) A novel methodology or form of scientific evidence may be admitted into evidence only if its proponent established that it has achieved general scientific acceptance among impartial and disinterested experts in the field.
MCLA 600.2955 (see also Daubert, supra, at 592-95.)
C. Summary
Under the Davis-Frye analysis, this court must first determine whether the proposed expert is qualified to testify in the proposed field and to answer the specific questions posed to him. If the court found that the expert was not qualified to testify in the proposed field, it would at that point exclude the proposed testimony. If the court found the proposed witness to be qualified as an expert, the court would then decide if the basis of the expert’s testimony is recognized “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” Nelson, supra, at 492. In making this determination, the court would be guided by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert and its codification in MCLA 600.2955.
The framework provided in Daubert and MCLA 600.2955 instructs the trial court to determine, inter alia: (1) whether the basis for the proffered expert’s opinion has been tested or replicated; (2) whether the studies relied on have been peer reviewed; (3) whether there exist generally accepted standards that govern the application of the methodology employed by the expert; (4) whether there is a known error rate; (5) whether the basis of the opinion is generally accepted in the scientific community; and (6) whether the basis of the opinion has any relevance outside the area of litigation.
Argument
A. Under the Michigan Rules of Evidence, [Expert] cannot testify where he is not qualified as an expert.
The thrust of [Expert’s] proffered testimony is that the accident of August 11, 2000 did not cause any injuries to the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff. (Exhibit 8, p. 15.) In fact, [Expert] has testified that low-speed accidents can never produce physical injuries. (Exhibit 8, p. 38.) [Expert] has no training of any kind in the medical sciences. (Exhibit 8, p. 25.) [Expert] never reviewed any medical files or history of the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff and has no idea what the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff’s alleged injuries are. (Exhibit 8, p. 16.) [Expert] does not know any of the possible causes of disk herniation. (Exhibit 8, page 32-33.) Even if [Expert] did know how a disk herniation was caused, he could not predict what kinds of forces could potentially create that injury. (Exhibit 8, p. 49.) The court is confronted, then, with an individual who plans to testify as an expert in an area that he knows nothing about.
In the strikingly similar case of Smelser, supra, the court held that it was reversible error to allow a biomechanical expert to testify about causation when he had no medical qualifications. In that case, a biomechanical engineer was called by the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff to render an opinion that a defective shoulder belt, and not a rear end collision, caused the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff’s back injuries. The court inquired into whether the expert witness was qualified to testify using the Daubert standards that are also present in Michigan’s Davis-Frye inquiry.
This opinion testimony goes beyond [the expert witness’s] expertise in biomechanics. As he previously admitted, he was qualified to render an opinion that made use of his discipline’s general principles, described the forces generated in the August 1989 rear-end collision, and spoke in general about the types of injuries those forces would generate. [The expert witness] is not a medical doctor who had reviewed [West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff’s] complete medical history, and his expertise in biomechanics did not qualify him to testify about the cause of [West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff’s] specific injuries.
(Smelser, 105 F.3d at 305) (emphasis added).
The case of Berry, supra, is also instructive on the proper role of the trial court in excluding inappropriate expert testimony. The Berry court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment where it found that West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff’s expert was not qualified to render an expert opinion concerning an alleged design defect. The court held that an expert in accident prevention can not testify about the design of a forklift and an alleged defect. See Berry, 108 F.Supp at 754. Specifically, the court held that the expert witness in the case lacked the specific, necessary qualifications required by Daubert and FRE 702, and therefore his testimony lacked the necessary foundation. Id. at 756. The expert witness in that case had only an attenuated and outdated connection to the proposed field of testimony. Id. at 750-53. “A proper foundation for a technical expert demonstrates ‘first hand familiarity’ with the subject of the testimony.” Id. at 749, quoting Isley v. Capuchin Province, 877 F. Supp. 1055, 1063-64 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
The issues of expert witness qualification and testimony foundation in Smelser and Berry are identical to the case at bar where [Expert], an automotive engineer, would testify as to whether the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff sustained a herniated disk or other injuries as a result of an automobile accident. While [Expert] may know a great deal about automotive engineering, he has no specialized or “first hand” knowledge of the human body or how and when it can be injured. [Expert] completely lacks the training to establish any link between specific forces involved in the accident and any injury that the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff could or could not have sustained. [Expert] did not review any of the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff’s medical records, either pre- or post-accident. (Exhibit 8, p. 13.) By making any conclusions about the injury causation potential of an accident, [Expert] steps well outside the bounds of his expertise and should not be allowed to testify as an expert in a field he knows nothing about.
B. Under the Michigan Rules of Evidence, [Expert’s] testimony is inadmissible where it uncritically relies on studies and tests not recognized by the scientific community.
1. The Studies
In his deposition testimony, [Expert] mentions several studies that he relied on to come to his conclusion about the injury-causing potential of the accident. (Exhibit 8, p. 53). The studies are SAE Technical Paper #950352, Data and Methods for Estimating the Severity of Minor Impacts, SAE Technical Paper #950394 (Exhibit 9), and Low Speed Automobile Accidents: Accident Reconstruction and Occupant Kinematics, Dynamics and Biomechanics (Alan J. Watts, Dale R. Atkinson & Corey Hennessy eds., 2ed., Lawyers & Judges Publishing Company 1999) (Exhibit 10) (see also Exhibit 8, p. 53). The SAE studies are not statistically reliable, not peer reviewed, and are simply conclusory reviews of prior unscientific studies, some involving bumper cars at amusement parks. The book Low Speed Automobile Accidents cites many studies that directly refute [Expert’s] assertions, despite his belief that the book and the SAE studies “all say the same thing.” (Exhibit 8, p. 53.)
In SAE Technical Paper #950352, the vehicles that were involved in the tests included “PNE bumper cars” and a “Modified WHAM II impact sled.” Many of the test subjects were male military personnel, and no attempt was made to show statistical significance of the test population. One test that the study relied on exemplifies the type of “research” done in these types of tests. The test involved 17 volunteers from the U.S. Army where “no injuries were reported at impact speeds up to 50 km/h and 9.9 g deceleration” and “all returned to duty immediately.”3 The inapplicability of this SAE “study” becomes apparent where the only thing the tests cited in the “study” seem to demonstrate is that is possible to not be injured in even the most severe impacts, not that injuries cannot occur. In fact, many of the test subjects did report injuries after the accidents. [Expert’s] intended use of this study to show that the West Palm Beach Car Accident Plaintiff could not have been injured in the accident is clearly inappropriate and unfounded, and should be disallowed by this court.
In Low Speed Automobile Accidents, supra, many chapters in the book directly refute[Expert’s] assertions. At page 347 of the publication, a contributing author discusses two peer-reviewed articles that directly attack the methodologies of the kind used by the tests cited in the SAE study discussed above. “The authors of this [peer-reviewed] article found that the papers commonly relied upon by defense biomechanists are premised upon significantly flawed methodology and that the conclusions reached regarding whiplash syndrome were not supported by the research methods used.”4 Id. (Exhibit 10 at 347).
In the second peer-reviewed article discussed, “the researchers were able to graphically demonstrate … the existence of the mechanism of injury for the cervical spine in low-impact collisions.” The contributing author notes further that
The researchers found that during a low-speed collision, the vertebrae undergo sagittal rotation about an abnormally high instantaneous axis of rotation. This rotation causes the vertebra to spin, the anterior elements separate and the posterior elements are forced into the vertebra below. The Spine paper therefore objectively demonstrates the mechanism for injury in a low-speed collision. The study has been recognized as the most significant advance in biomechanics of whiplash since 1955.
Id. at 348 (emphasis added.)5
Not only do these cited peer-review studies cast serious doubt on the final conclusions [Expert] reaches, they also call into question [Expert’s] ability not only to understand the latest research in biomechanics, but also simply to understand the material in the treatises he relies on. [Expert’s] belief that low-speed collisions cannot cause injuries simply cannot be reconciled with the medical findings cited in his own reference materials. (Exhibit 8, p.38.)
2. There is no acceptable basis for [Expert’s] testimony under the Michigan Rules of Evidence.
This court should find that [Expert’s] testimony has no reliable basis for a number of reasons, drawn from the suggested guidelines in the Davis-Frye and Daubert tests.
(1) The basis of [Expert’s] testimony has not been tested or replicated. [Expert] relies on tests that are reported in subsequent studies and that basically involve a wide variety of human volunteers who are subjected to low-speed collisions and then interviewed as to any possible injuries. [Expert] offers no reason to believe that these methods for testing the injury potential for accidents have been tested or replicated in an effort to establish their scientific validity. While [Expert] suggests that the great number of such tests (“around four hundred total now”; Exhibit 8, page 55) seems to add weight to his findings, he does not acknowledge the basic scientific principle that even a million tests that use questionable and untested methods are as unreliable as the first. In fact, an article cited by a treatise that [Expert] admits to have used directly attacks the tests he relies on.6
(2) The basis of [Expert’s] testimony has not been peer-reviewed. [Expert] is simply wrong when he asserts that the SAE studies he relies on are peer-reviewed. (Exhibit 8, pp. 52-53.) SAE studies are not peer-reviewed. SAE is simply an information exchange, and the papers that are published through it are not submitted to other engineers or specialists for review prior to their being published. SAE also does not ensure the validity of the statistical analysis or methodological design of the articles. The question of whether SAE studies are peer-reviewed is put to rest in a text [Expert] himself relies on. “The head counsel for SAE, Steve Daum, has confirmed that SAE does not conduct peer-review analysis of the articles it publishes. SAE does not ensure the validity of statistical analysis or methodological design of papers it publishes.” (Exhibit 10 at 342.)
SAE studies cannot be used as a basis for an opinion under standards set forth in Daubert, MCLA 600.2955, and in a Davis-Frye analysis (see Daubert, supra at 593; see also Nelson, supra, at 491). [Expert] cannot be allowed to rely on SAE studies in making any conclusions whatsoever, given their lack of validity and their lack of peer-review status. Without his SAE studies, [Expert’s] proposed testimony clearly lacks any foundation, and must be excluded.
(3) Generally accepted standards do not exist that would govern the application of the methodology employed by [Expert]. [Expert’s] “rough and ready” application of the findings of the SAE-cited tests to the accident in question do not follow generally accepted standards. Indeed, [Expert’s] analysis suggests no methodology whatsoever. Instead, it is simply the application of one set of unreliable, unscientific facts (the results of the tests he relies on) to another unrelated set of facts ([Expert’s] calculations as to the forces involved in the accident.) Obviously, there can be no generally acceptable standards that would govern the application of a methodology where no methodology exists.
(4) The tests relied on by [Expert] have no known error rate, nor does his application of those tests to the accident in the question. The tests discussed in the SAE papers do not give a potential error rate, nor does [Expert] when he applies the finding of those tests to his own analysis. Even when he recognizes that differences in height and other physical characteristics would affect how a person might be injured in an accident, he discards those notions and concludes that people are never injured in accidents. (“…[I]t’s known that at low-speed accidents humans aren’t injured….” (Exhibit 8, p. 37.) In effect, [Expert] imagines an error rate of zero for his tests and their application to specific accidents. While [Expert] may be comfortable with his estimated error potential, it should strike others as highly suspect.
(5) The basis of [Expert’s] testimony is not generally accepted outside the general community. In fact, one of the treatises that [Expert] relies heavily upon discusses persuasive peer-reviewed findings that directly refute his assertions and those of other studies discussed in the treatise. (See Exhibit 10 at 347.)
(6) The basis of [Expert’s] testimony is not used outside of a litigation setting. The only practical value of these unscientific tests is to provide expert witnesses with a basis for their opinion that an accident could not have caused an injury. They would be of no use to medical experts or to the automotive industry.
In Smelser, supra, the court found that the biomechanic’s opinion with regard to the defective nature of a safety belt was not admissible. The court found that the expert failed to establish that any of the tests he relied on were “based on scientifically valid principles, were repeatable, had been the subject of peer review or publication or were generally acceptable methods….” Smelser at 304-305. In Berry, supra, the court also held that “even assuming arguendo that [the expert witness was qualified to testify, his] opinions are quite simply unsupported by any reasonable measure of technical data or foundation and are wholly unreliable.” Id. at 754.
This court should follow the courts in Smelser and Berry and exclude the supposed “biomechanical” testimony of [Expert] where his testimony is based on tests and studies that have not been verified (and in fact have been debunked). The studies have not been peer-reviewed, are not generally acceptable, have an unknown error-rate, and have no useful purpose outside of a litigation setting. This court should join the Smelser and Berry courts in refusing to allow junk science into the courtroom.
Conclusion
[Expert] cannot testify as to any issue relating to causation in this case. He has neither the training nor any qualifications that would allow him to comment on any matter relating to injuries or their possible causes. Even if [Expert] did have such relevant training, the basis for the opinions he plans to express do not meet the standards set out in a Davis-Frye or Daubert analysis, which require courts to determine whether an expert’s opinion is based on recognized scientific knowledge.
Footnotes
1 People v. Davis, 343 Mich. 348, 72 N.W.2d 269 (1955); Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013 (1923).