STAHL,
v.

METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY,

No. 81-1497.
June 7, 1983.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 4, 1983.

This case was about a person who lost their life because a Florida county allegedly failed to maintain it's bicycle path. There are a couple of rules of law that are born in this case; a car accident victim in Palm Beach County Florida must prove: 1. A duty owed 2. Breach of that Duty 3. Injuries as a result of that breach. That is called (proximate causation). Proximate causation means: Cause in fact, fancy legal words for there is something that happened which is directly linked to the car accident victim's injuries associated or connected to their car crash. This is why you need to have a decent Boynton Beach Florida car crash attorney.

The courts have developed a test called the "but for test". This means but for the other guy's driving skills the car accident injury victim would not have had an injury. There must be a natural and foreseeable and direct and continuous sequence of factual events between the negligent act and the victim's injuries.

In cases where there is more than one actor who's combined conduct led to the injury the but for test is not applicable. Instead, the Florida courts have developed what is called the substantial factors test.
For example, if Palm Beach County was negligent in maintaining a bicycle path by county, which caused a of 13-year-old bycyclist to veer from path and drive into adjoining street, and then an oncoming vehicle struck the boy and killed him. The "but for" test would not be controlling so to speak, it would be the by the "substantial factor" exception to that test.

See what Professor Prosser writes about the element of priximate cause. "It seems clear at the outset that the "proximate cause" element of a negligence action embraces, at the very least, a causation-in-fact test, that is, the defendant's negligence must be a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's claimed injuries. In this respect, a negligence action is no different from any other tort action as clearly there can be no liability for any tort unless it be shown that the defendant's act or omission was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's claimed injuries. To be sure, such a showing, without more, is insufficient to establish the "proximate cause" element of a negligence action, but it is plainly a sine qua non ingredient thereof". See e.g., W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 41 (4th ed. 1971).

Prosser further writes: "Restricted to the question of causation alone, and regarded merely as a rule of exclusion, the ‘but for' rule serves to explain the greater number of cases; but there is one type of situation in which it fails. If two causes concur to bring about an event, and either one of them, operating alone, would have been sufficient to cause the identical result, some other test is needed. Two motorcycles simultaneously pass the plaintiff's horse, which is frightened and runs away; either one alone would have caused the fright. A stabs C with a knife, and B fractures C's skull with a rock; either wound would be fatal, and C dies from the effects of both. The defendant sets a fire, which merges with a fire from some other source; the combined fires burn the plaintiff's property, but either one would have done it alone. In such cases it is quite clear that each cause has in fact played so important a part in producing the result that responsibility should be imposed upon it; and it is equally clear that neither can be absolved from that responsibility upon the ground that the identical harm would have occurred without it, or there would be no liability at all."

In cases similar to those cited by Prosser in the above, Florida courts overseeing car accidents have abandoned the "but for" test and have employed instead a "substantial factor", that means the "Defendant's conduct in an action for personal injuries is considered a cause of the event if it was a material and substantial factor in bringing it about."

The following is language from the case of : Stahl vs. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY,

"Plainly, the defendant Dade County's negligence in failing to properly maintain the bicycle path in question at the point where Andrew Stahl, the plaintiff's decedent, departed from the path was a cause-in-fact of the said decedent's death. Utilizing the "but for" test of actual causation, it is clear that "but for" the defendant's negligence herein, Andrew would not have been forced off the bicycle path, would not have been propelled onto an adjoining grassy area where menacing trees were located, would not have driven onto the adjoining street to avoid hitting the said trees, and would not have been struck and killed by an oncoming car. "But for" the defendant's negligence in the maintenance of the bicycle path, this tragic sequence of events would never have occurred. At the very least, a genuine issue of material fact is presented making a summary judgment inappropriate here.

[8] It should be noted that this is not a "concurring cause" case where each of several causes could alone have produced-in-fact the death of the plaintiff's decedent. The negligent maintenance of the bicycle path, the act of the plaintiff's decedent in driving into the street, and the act of the oncoming car in striking the plaintiff's decedent could not, acting individually and independently of one another, have struck and killed the said plaintiff's decedent; all of these forces combined in sequence to lead to the decedent's death and all arguably are a cause-in-fact to the said death under the "but for" test. In short, the "substantial factor" exception is inapplicable here.FN9 See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Watson, 94 Fla. 571, 113 So. 716 (1927) (syllabus by ct., no. 10)."